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The Compensation Décisions 
of the Anti-Inflation Board 
Allan M. Maslove 
and 
Gène Swimmer 
This paper examines the déterminants of compensa-
tion décisions of the Anti-Inflation Board during its first 
year of existance. A bureaucratie behavior model is 
developed and tested using multiple régression techniques. 
The inauguration of a program of wage and price controls in 
October 1975 raised a long list of issues for public and académie debate. 
Many of thèse issues will remain unresolved for a considérable period 
of time pending the accumulation of sufficient évidence to permit 
analytical investigations into the impact of the program. However, in at 
least one area a considérable amount of data hâve already been gathered, 
enabling one to examine certain aspects of the program and reach at 
least intérim conclusions. This area concerns the wage and salary 
compensation décisions of the Anti-Inflation Board (AIB). 
In particular, what we examine empirically in this paper are the 
déterminants of the AIB's compensation décisions from which one might 
draw some conclusions regarding the decision-making process of the 
AIB.x While our results must be regarded as tentative because the 
program is ongoing, we believe the data reveal relationships that are 
sufficiently strong to warrant reporting at this time. 
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section briefly 
reviews the mechanics of the décision process of the AIB in the com-
pensation cases it handles. The second discusses two other investiga-
tions that hâve been undertaken into AIB compensation rulings. In the 
third section, we présent the empirical models and in the fourth the 
results are presented and discussed. A final brief section summarizes the 
research. 
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THE MECHANICS OF THE DECISION PROCESS OF THE AIB 
For every wage increase which cornes under the Anti-Inflation 
Board's jurisdiction the employer is required to submit an AIB 2 form. 
This form provides the Board with the détails of the negotiated seule-
ment (NEGOTD)2 and the information required to calculate the arith-
metic guideline pertaining to that labour group (GUIDELN). In fact, in 
advance of a seulement the employer or employées may calculate the 
guideline themselves or hâve the Board calculate it for them. 
The guideline is determined according to a set formula which does 
not permit any lee-way in its calculation.3 It is determined by summing 
the following three factors : 
1) a basic protection or cost-of-living component equal to 8, 6, and 4 per 
cent respectively in the first, second, and third years of the program; 
2) a national productivity factor of 2 per cent ; and 
3) an expérience adjustment factor of between minus and plus 2 per cent 
per year determined by the group's compensation history over the prev-
ious two years and the movement in the Consumer Price Index over 
the same period. 
Officers in the compensation branch of the AIB then process each 
case to détermine the relationship of the negotiated seulement (NEGOTD), 
including non-wage beneflts, to the arithmetic guideline (GUIDELN). 
If the former is less than the latter the AIB has no authority to re-
commend any adjustment in the contract. If the former exceeds the 
latter the officer examines the grounds for spécial considération (eg., 
historical relationship with other comparable groups). A recommenda-
tion is then prepared. The case is then presented to the Board itself 
for a décision. The Board's approved increase (APPRVD) may fall 
anywhere within (and include) the boundaries set by the guideline at 
the low end and the negotiated seulement at the high end. 
One aspect of the décision process is worth spécial mention. 
Cases in which the negotiated seulement is within 2 percentage points of 
the guideline are treated somewhat differently. In thèse cases, the senior 
bureaucrats of the compensation branch détermine whether the nego-
1
 We refer hère collectively to the Board itself and to its supporting bureaucracy. 
This is the case throughout the paper unless a distinction between the two is specifically 
made. 
2
 In the appropriate places the mnemonics which are used in the analysis are 
identified. 
3
 The guidelines are subject to an upper limit of $2400 and to a lower limit for 
lower paid employées. Any cases in which either of thèse limits was binding were 
excluded from our sample. 
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tiated seulement should be approved or rolled back fully or partially. 
The case goes to the Board only for pro forma approval. This procé-
dure raises the question of différences in the décision patterns between 
cases above and below this 2 per cent cutoff. We comment on this 
possibility in section IV. 
After the AIB décision is rendered the employer and employée 
groups involved, if unsatisfied, hâve the option of going back to the 
Board with additional information and asking for a reconsideration of 
their case.4 The AIB then may revise its décision. Our sample includes 
the final décisions in any such cases but we hâve no way of identifying 
thèse cases individually. 
INVESTIGATIONS INTO AIB COMPENSATION RULINGS 
To our knowledge, thus far, only two pièces of research hâve 
appeared which hâve empirically examined the AIB's compensation 
décisions. The first study is by Foot and Poirer and the second much 
briefer pièce is by Osberg. 
Foot and Poirer5 analyse the AIB's compensation décisions as the 
outcomes of a two-stage process. Their model is « institutional» as 
opposed to « behavioural » since they believe the latter models are not 
likely to yield any empirically testable hypothèses. The first décision 
in their model is to détermine whether the contract should be rolled 
back to the arithmetic guidelines, granted the negotiated seulement or 
granted some intermediate increase. The second is to décide on the 
exact recommendation for the intermediate cases. 
Their results on the first stage décision model suggest that 
unionized employées may be less successful than non-unionized in 
securing approval for their negotiated seulement, that industry type may 
make a différence, that there is less likelihood of gaining approval for 
a higher negotiated seulement and more likelihood of gaining approval if 
the guideline is higher. Other factors (including région, sector, and 
number of employées) were not significant. The second stage results 
4
 The group may, of course, also appeal to the Administrator who has the 
power to reconsider and adjust the AIB's décisions. We do not hâve any information 
as to which cases may hâve been formally appealed in this manner. 
5
 D. K. FOOT and D. J. POIRER, «Public Décision Making in Canada: The 
Case of the Anti-Inflation Board», Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, 
Working Paper Number 7709, June, 1977. 
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suggest that industry and occupation are significant influences as are the 
guidelines and the negotiated settlements. 
Two aspects of the Foot and Poirer paper warrant comment in the 
context of our own work. First, the two-stage décision processs, while 
statistically élégant, postulâtes what may be a non-existent dichotomy in 
the AIB's décision process. Secondly, while we only suggest the 
outlines of a formai behavioural model, the results we présent in the 
fourth section do support this approach, and in some cases quite 
strongly so. From thèse results we would in turn argue that a behaviour-
al (optimizing) approach in studying the AIB's décisions may indeed be 
fruitful. 
The article by Osberg6 présents the results of a single multiple 
(OLS) régression model. Board approved increases are run as a function 
of the guidelines, negotiated excess over the guidelines (ADIFNEG, in 
our model) the excess squared (ADIFNEG2) and a teacher group dum-
my variable. Osberg finds that the AIB approved seulement is negatively 
influenced by the squared term and positively influenced by the other 
three. Thus AIB approvals are higher if the guideline is higher, if the 
negotiated seulement is higher (though at a diminishing rate) and if a 
teachers' contract is involved. 
As will become apparent in the following sections, there are in-
teresting correspondences between Osberg's, Foot and Poirer's and our 
own results particularly with respect to the influence of the guidelines 
and the negotiated settlements on the AIB's approved increases. 
EMPIRICAL MODELS 
In this section, we develop an empirical model for AIB décisions 
as to the allowable portion (if any) of a wage increase7 negotiated in 
excess of the guideline. Throughout the empirical analysis, two dif-
férent dépendent variables will be utilized : the percentage wage increase 
approved (APPRVD) and the absolute différence between the percen-
tage wage increase approved and the percentage wage increase allowed 
by the guideline (ADIFAPP = APPRVD - GUIDELN). The former 
spécification was used by Foot and Poirer and by Osberg. We hâve no 
a priori reasons to assume that either is superior. 
6
 L. OSBERG, «A Note on the Wage Décisions of the Anti-Inflation Board», 
Canadian Public Policy, III: 3, Summer, 1977, pp. 377-380. 
7
 Throughout this paper, wage increase is really used as shorthand for the 
increase in compensation, inclusive of wage scale, fringe benefits and merit pay increases. 
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Our intention is to examine the impact of a number of variables on 
AIB compensation décisions for what they reveal about the Board's 
decision-making process. In gênerai terms one might hypothesize that 
the main objective of the AIB early in its life was to win acceptance as a 
legitimate instrument of the government's overall anti-inflation policy 
with both the rest of the bureaucracy and the gênerai public. In addition 
to the problems encountered by any new bureau, the AIB began in an 
uncertain and sceptical environment; thus one might expect that it 
would be particularly concerned with gaining acceptance. This gênerai 
goal might be restated in terms of two other, more operational sub-goals. 
First, the AIB must be seen to be effective in curbing the rate of 
inflation ; on the compensation side this means showing success in low-
ering negotiated wage settlements. Secondly, the AIB would attempt 
to avoid alienating affected groups to an extent that would lead to public 
discontent and demands for changes in its mandate (including, at the 
extrême, ending the controls program). Thèse sub-goals may very often 
be contradictory thereby leaving the Board with a séries of difficult 
trade-off décisions. 
In this context, the impact of labour militancy on AIB compensa-
tion décisions is particularly interesting. Although labour militancy is a 
multifaceted concept, we can identify two aspects of militancy: the 
ability to negotiate a settlement in excess of the guidelines, and the 
willingness to go out on strike if the AIB décision is unacceptable. 
The Canadian Labour Congres s has advised its member unions to 
enter contract negotiations under the premise that the AIB does not 
exist. Affiliâtes should try to negotiate the most advantageous contracts 
they can, whether or not they exceed the guidelines, and deal with the 
prospect of AIB rollbacks at a later date. Obviously, management 
negotiators generally reject this view although the Ontario Labour Rela-
tions Board has ruled that a refusai to discuss a wage increase in excess 
of the guideline is not bargaining in good faith. The degree to which 
the negotiated settlements exceed the arithmetic guidelines will ultima-
tely dépend on the relative strengths of the parties which in turn will 
be a function of objective criteria such as the demand for labour in the 
industry, inventory and strike fund levels as well as subjective criteria 
such as the ability of the union leadership to get the workers out. 
How will the threat of a strike affect the AIB's reaction to negotiated 
settlements which exceed the guidelines? One plausible possibility 
would be that the greater the strike threat, the greater the percentage 
above the guideline the AIB would be induced to approve. That is, the 
Board, when faced with the real prospect of a strike if its décision is 
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viewed unfavourably, will approve a more generous wage increase, 
other things being equal. In terms of our gênerai hypothesis concerning 
the Board's acceptance and legitimacy, the costs of a décision which 
prompts a strike may be very high. 
This hypothesis can only be tested indirectly because we could not 
détermine the likelihood of a strike for any labour unit in the sample, 
or even if the group had a previous history of striking. The existence of 
a union is a necessary condition for a strike. It thus seems reasonable 
to assume that non-union workers should be treated less generoulsy by 
the Board. A dummy variable (NON-UNION) has been included to test 
this hypothesis. There are, however, huge variations in the militancy 
exhibited by unions. To hopefully account for the variation we hâve 
placed each labour unit into one of 43 différent industries. For each 
industry we were able to develop a strike index (STRIDEX) defined as 
the average of days lost due to strikes and lockouts for the years 1974 
and 1975 divided by the average employment for the two years.8 Every 
observation in a spécifie industry was assigned the value of the index 
for that industry. We postulate positive relationships between the strike 
index (STRIDEX) and both dépendent variables. 
We also would expect that the greater the negotiated seulement 
above the guideline (ADIFNEG), the greater the percentage above the 
guideline the Board will approve (ADIFAPP). In other words, the more 
y ou ask for the more y ou get. Such «compromise» solutions might be 
expected to émerge given the trade-off problem (between achieving 
effective rollbacks and avoiding undue aliénation of the concerned 
groups) faced by the AIB. This would suggest a désire to avoid extrême 
points.9 In addition, as did Osberg, we postulate a nonlinear relation-
ship between approved and negotiated rates, where there are diminish-
8
 A two year average must be used because in many industries the typical 
agreement lasts two years, so few man-days lost in 1975 could simply mean that 
little bargaining was done during that year. Data on man-days lost came from Labour 
Canada, Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, 1975. Total employment data came from 
Statistics Canada, 72-002, Employment Earnings and Hours ; 72-009, Local Government 
Employment ; 72-007, Provincial Government Employment ; and 72-004, Fédéral Govern-
ment employment. 
9
 There may be a strong parallel between AIB compensation rulings and labour 
arbitration décisions. It is a commonly accepted belief that arbitrators will tend to «split 
the différence» between employer and employée wage positions in an attempt not 
to alienate the parties and thereby reduce the probability of being employed as an 
arbitrator again. For example, see Cari STEVENS, «Is Compulsory Arbitration Compat-
ible with Bargaining?», Industrial Relations, Vol. 5, No. 2, February, 1966, pp. 38-52. 
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ing returns to negotiating larger rates above the guideline. In summary 
then, we expect that the two dépendent variables are positively related 
to the negotiated wage increase and negatively related to the negotiated 
wage squared: 
(+) (-) 
(1) APPRVD = f (NEGOTD, NEGOTD2) 
(+) ( - ) 
(2) ADIFAPP = g(ADIFNEG, ADIFNEG2) 
where: ADIFNEG = NEGOTD - GUIDELN 
ADIFAPP = APPRVD - GUIDELN 
Additional independent variables allow us to test other aspects of 
the Board's décision making. Presumably the AIB will generate more 
acceptance by being tough on groups who are more in the public eye. 
On balance, public sector contracts are more visible than those in 
the private sector and large labour groups are more visible than small 
groups. We therefore predict that approved wage increases (APPRVD 
and ADIFAPP) will decrease as the number of workers affected by the 
décision (NOEMPLY) increases. We also expect lower wage approvals 
for public sector workers broadly defined to include ail fédéral, prov-
incial and municipal workers (SECTOR). 
Another important aspect of AIB décision making is the time 
pattern of the décisions. As a bureau becomes more established 
and procédures become more ritualized, discrétion for individual 
officers diminishes. This phenomenon would translate into fewer 
exceptions to the rule (the guideline) and thus lower wage rate 
approvals, ceteris paribus, as the AIB progresses. In addition, 
there exists a borderline problem. The Board may hâve been 
hésitant to roll back heavily a contract considered soon after the 
beginning of controls if it meant a large déviation from comparable 
contract signed just prior to controls. However, over time a "wean-
ing" process would occur as the pre-control settlements fade from 
prominence. To test thèse hypothèses, we define an independent 
variable (BDDATE), as the âge of the AIB in months at the time 
of the spécifie wage approval décision. We expect a négative rela-
tionship between BDDATE and both dépendent variables. 
Not ail contracts submitted to the AIB expire in one year. 
Some contracts hâve a two or even three-year duration. Our data 
only refer to the wage increase approved for the first year. The 
contract length (CLENGTH) is however included as a separate 
independent variable. One could speculate that given a choice of 
which year's wage increase to eut back in a multi-year contract, 
the AIB would choose to corne down harder on the first year and 
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be softer on subséquent years' wage increases. In this way, the 
Board gains more credibility in its crucial first year of existence 
without unduly penalizing the employée group involved. If this 
scénario is correct, contract length should be inversely related to 
wage increases approved. 
We hâve included the guideline wage increase (GUIDELN) 
as an independent variable. For the équation in which APPRVD is 
the dépendent variable, the GUIDELN represents its lower 
bound. We would therefore expect that the higher is the GUIDELN 
variable the higher will be the dépendent variable, ceteris paribus. For 
the équation in which ADIFAPP is the dépendent variable we hâve no 
a priori expectation as to the direction of influence. One could postulate 
scénarios in which a higher guideline would prompt the Board to ap-
prove a seulement either closer to or more in excess of the guideline. 
Another possible déterminant of Board décisions is the aver-
age wage level of the workers in the bargaining unit. At the 
extrêmes, there should be an effect because the régulations state 
that workers earning less than $3.50 per hour are exempt from 
controls and high paid workers are limited to a $2400 per year 
increase, regardless of the appropriate guideline. Our data do not 
include cases in which thèse upper and lower bounds are relevant. 
In any event it is more interesting to examine intermediate 
wage contracts. Is the Board more likely to approve a higher 
wage increase in percentage terms if the wage base is lower? No 
direct data on wage levels are provided by the AIB. We again 
resort to classifying ail cases by industry and assigning average 
industry weekly wage levels (WEEKWGE) for December 1975.10 
If the AIB redistributes income to lower paid workers, WEEK-
WAGE will be inversely related to the dépendent variables. 
Finally, previous studies hâve been concerned with régional 
préférences, if any, of AIB décisions. Each case has been clas-
sified as: ATLANTIC, QUEBEC, ONTARIO, PRAIRIES, B.C. or 
NATIONAL. From this six-way classification, we construct five 
régional dummy variables (the NATIONAL dummy has been 
deleted). 
10
 WEEKWGE is defined as the average weekly wage of ail employées for 
December 1975 divided by total employment for 1975. For public sector employées we 
are forced to use total payroll divided by total employment instead. Ail data came from 
Statistics Canada, Op. Cit. #72-001 ; 72-004; 72-007 ; 72-009. 
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We summarize the models below for the two dépendent va-
riables, the percent wage increase approved (APPRVD) and the 
percentage point wage increase in excess of the guideline ap-
proved (ADIFAPP) indicating where applicable, the expected 
signs of the coefficients : 
(+) (-) (-) (+) 
(1) APPRVD = f NEGOTD, NEGOTD2, NON-UNION, STRIDEX, 
(-) (-) (-) (+) 
BDDATE, SECTOR, NOEMPLY, GUIDELN, 
(-) 
CLENGTH, WEEKWGE, ATLANTIC, QUEBEC, 
ONTARIO, PRAIRIES, B.C.) 
(+) (-) (-) (+) 
(2) ADIFAPP = g (ADIFNEG, ADIFNEG2, NON-UNION, STRIDEX 
(-) (-) (-) 
BDDATE, SECTOR, NOEMPLY, GUIDELN, 
(-) 
CLENGTH, WEEKWGE, ATLANTIC, QUEBEC, 
ONTARIO, PRAIRIES, B.C.) 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE MODEL 
Before presenting empirical estimâtes of the model, we will briefly 
describe the sample. AH décisions between March and May 1976 were 
released publicly by the AIB. In addition, the Board was kind enough 
to provide us with ail settlements for the month of November 1976. 
The sample consists of ail complète cases reported in those four months 
where the negotiated wage settlement exceeded the guideline.n 
Case data are the sources of ail the previously defined variables 
except the industry strike index and average wage level. Table I présents 
the means and standard déviations of ail quantitative variables for the 
entire sample. The relative size of the wage increases negotiated, 
allowed by the guideline and eventually approved are particularly 
illuminating. The average wage rate negotiated called for a 15.9% 
increase compared with a mean guideline of 9.8%. Not surprisingly, the 
mean wage increase approved was practically at the midpoint of the 
other two rates, 12.7%. 
11
 Published décisions can be found in the AIB News Releases — 76-56, 76-71, 
76-83, 76-94. From the case data, it was not always possible to détermine the région 
and/or the industry of the group involved. Thèse cases had to be deleted. In addition, 
cases at the upper and lower bounds of the controls program were dropped. The 
resulting sample contains 346 cases. 
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TABLE I 
Descriptive Statistics 
Full Sample: N = 346) ' 
VARIABLE ME AN STANDARD DEVIATION 
NEGOTD 15.86 percent 7.08 
GUIDELN 9.76 percent 1.82 
APPRVD 12.68 percent 4.20 
NOEMPLY 333.29 employées 1101.84 
BDDATE2 3.50 months 2.31 
CLENGTH 1.41 years 0.61 
ADIFNEG 6.10 percentage points 6.86 
ADIFAPP 2.92 percentage points 3.61 
STRIDEX3 2.28 percent 3.06 
WEEKWGE3 222. dollars 52.42 
STRIDEX4 2.29 percent 2.47 
WEEKWGE4 207. dollars 37.04 
1
 Twenty-eight percent of the cases involved public sector labour groups. 
Seventy-one percent of the cases were unionized bargaining units. 
2
 March 1976 was the first month in the sample. 
3
 Calculated on the basis of 43 industrial sector s. 
4
 Calculated on the basis of 346 observations. 
Tables 2 and 3 présent the linear régression estimâtes of our model 
using the wage increase approved by the AIB (APPRVD) and the wage 
increase approved in excess of the guideline (ADIFAPP), respectively, 
as the dépendent variables. The first column of each table gives the 
estimate of the entire model and the second column shows a simplified 
version of the model including only statistically significant variables. 
The overall fit of the models is excellent and no appréciable réduction 
in R2 occurs from dropping non-significant independent variables. 
It is necessary to address a statistical issue in advance of a 
detailed discussion of the régression results. Both dépendent variables 
hâve a limited range of values. APPRVD has the guideline increase as 
its minimum and the negotiated seulement as its maximum. Likewise, 
ADIFAPP has a zéro minimum and ADIFNEG as a maximum. Linear 
régression techniques may generate inefficient estimâtes with limited 
dépendent variables.12 Consequently, we hâve also estimated the model 
using TOBIT analysis. Thèse results are presented in the Appendix. 
The two techniques generate estimâtes which are consistent with res-
pect to sign, significance, and magnitude. 
12
 For discussion of this problem in détail see FOOT & POIRER, Op. Cit. 
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TABLE II 
Régression Results for the Percentage Wage Increase 
Approved by the Anti-Inflation Board 
(APPRVD = Dépendent Variable) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
CONSTANT 
NEGOTD 
NEGOTD2 
GUIDELN 
EDDATE 
SECTOR 
CLENGTH 
STRIDEX 
WEEKWGE 
NOEMPLY 
NON-UNION 
ATLANTIC • 
QUEBEC 
ONTARIO 
PRAIRIES 
B.C. 
R2 
F 
N 
COEFFICIENT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
(t VALUE IN PARENTHESIS) 
• 1.2877 
.6973 
12.10)*** 
.0056 
- 5.26)*** 
.6866 
10.83)*** 
.1336 
- 2.63)*** 
.5214 
• 1.68)* 
• .3352 
1.64) 
.1239 
1.84)* 
.0016 
• .36) 
.0001 
•54) 
.0538 
.20) 
.5069 
.26) 
.3060 
.16) 
.6478 
.34) 
.7611 
.39) 
.3620 
.18) 
.809 
92.92 
346 
2.0986 
.7033 
12 79)*** 
.0057 
5.47)*** 
.6764 
11.26)*** 
.1262 
2.70)*** 
.6140 
2.28)** 
.3488 
1.90)* 
.0999 
2.27)** 
.807 
202.31 
346 
* Significant for a two-tail test at the 10% level. 
** Significant for a two-tail test at the 5% level. 
*** Significant for a two-tail test at the 1% level. 
1
 The régional variable is a six-way classification: ATLANTIC, QUEBEC, 
ONTARIO, PRAIRIES, B.C., NATIONAL. The «NATIONAL» dummy variable has 
been dropped. 
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TABLE III 
Régression 
of the 
Results for the Percentage Wage Increase in Excess 
Guideline Approved by the Anti-Inflation Board 
(ADIFAPP = DEPENDENT VARIABLE) 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
CONSTANT 
ADIFNEG 
ADIFNEG2 
GUIDELN 
BEDDATE 
SECTOR 
CLENGTH 
STRIDEX 
WEEKWGE 
NOEMPLY 
NON-UNION 
ATLANTIC 
QUEBEC 
ONTARIO 
PRAIRIES 
B.C. 
R2 
F 
N 
- .0830 
.5897 
( 15 79)*** 
- .0056 
(- 5.52)*** 
.1911 
( 3.24)*** 
- .1373 
(- 2.72)*** 
- .5876 
(- 1.88)* 
- .3164 
(- 1.56) 
.1146 
( 1.70)* 
- .0009 
(- -20) 
.0000 
( -53) 
.0760 
( -28) 
- .4709 
(- -24) 
- .3533 
(- -18) 
- .6573 
(- .34) 
- .7760 
(- .40) 
- .4230 
(- .22) 
.743 
COEFFICIENT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
(t VALUE IN PARENTHESIS) 
- .7586 
.5942 
16.96)*** 
- .0056 
- 5.76)*** 
.1844 
3.24)*** 
- .1288 
- 2.77)*** 
- .6889 
- 2.54)** 
- .3292 
- 1.82)* 
.0998 
2.28)** 
63.51 
346 
.741 
138.38 
346 
* Significant for a two-tail test at the 10% level. 
** Significant for a two-tail test at the 5% level. 
*** Significant for a two-tail test at the 1% level. 
1
 The régional variable is a six-way classification: ATLANTIC, QUEBEC, 
ONTARIO, PRAIRIES, B.C., NATIONAL. The «NATIONAL» dummy variable has 
been dropped. 
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A comparison of Tables 2 and 3 illustrâtes that the choice of 
dépendent variable, APPRVD or ADIFAPP, makes little différence with 
respect to the gênerai character of results. The same set of independent 
variables is significant under either spécification as are the respective 
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients. Although the APPRVD régres-
sions explain 81% (as opposed to 75%) of the variation in the dépendent 
variable, we feel neither spécification to be statistically superior. Ac-
cordingly, we shall présent the results for both dépendent variables. 
The most powerful variables in explaining the AIB wage increase 
décisions (APPRVD or ADIFAPP) are the negotiated wage rate (NE-
GOTD or ADIFNEG) and its square (NEGOTD2 or ADIFNEG2) 
Thèse two pairs of variables explain 71% of the variance in both 
APPRVD and ADIFAPP. The hypothesis that the more you ask for, 
the more you get from the AIB, is clearly borne out. Using reasonable 
negotiated wage rates for our sample we can estimate the AIB wage 
rate approvals using both dépendent variables : 
NEGOTD APPRVD ADIFNEG ADIFAPP 
(= NEGOTD - GUIDELN) (= APPRVD - GUIDELN) 
10% 5.9% 2% 1.1% 
15 7.9 5 2.7 
20 9.5 10 4.8 
25 10.4 15 6.3 
Although there are diminishing returns within our sample, there are 
continuing benefits to labour groups from negotiating as large increases 
as they can. 
Our major hypothesis about the Board's reaction to labour 
militancy appears correct. Holding other influences constant (in parti-
cular, the size of the negotiated settlement), industries with higher 
levels of the strike index (STRIDEX) hâve been awarded more generous 
wage rate approvals by the AIB. The relationship is statistically signifi-
cant at the 10% for the entire model but once statistically unrelated 
independent variables are dropped to reduce multicollinearity, STRI-
DEX reaches higher significance levels (5%) in régressions for both 
dépendent variables. 
Neither study discussed in section II attempted to measure labour 
militancy, and Osberg found a significant positive relationship between 
the teacher dummy variable and wage rates approved by the Board. 
We believe that this corrélation results from the higher levels of the 
strike index for teachers (more than one standard déviation above 
the mean) and that other groups of significant size with comparable 
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STRIDEX values would be similarly treated. We find that the AIB 
grants public sector (SECTOR) labour groups about a 0.6 percent 
lower wage increase than otherwise similar private sector groups. This 
resuit is consistent with our earlier view that the Board would be 
tougher on more visible groups of workers. 
A definite time pattern in AIB décisions appears to exist. As we 
hypothesized, the Board became tougher as time passed, cutting wage 
settlements by additional .13% per month. Other things equal, cases 
which came before the Board in November 1976 had an extra .65% 
trimmed from settlements than if they had corne before the AIB in 
March.13 
As expected, the higher the guideline (GUIDELN), the higher the 
ultimate wage rate approved (APPRVD). Ceteris paribus, a percentage 
point increase in the guideline is associated with % of a percentage 
point increase in the AIB approved rate. What is more surprising is the 
significant positive relationship between GUIDELN and the percentage 
point wage increase above the guideline which is approved by the AIB 
(ADIFAPP). It appears that the stronger the «merits» of the case 
(exemplified by the guideline value), the better the likelihood of receiv-
ing an exceptional seulement from the Board. A one percentage point 
increase in GUIDELN is associated with a .19 percentage point in-
crease in ADIFAPP. 
The last statistically important variable in the régression équations 
is the length of the contract (CLENGTH). Though the coefficient is 
barely significant (10% in the simplified model), it appears that, when 
faced with a multiyear contract, the Board cornes down harder on the 
first year's increase. We don't know if they make corresponding 
upward adjustments in later years of the contract, as we hypothesized 
earlier, but, on average, two year contracts had an additional {h of a 
percentage point trimmed from their first year's wage seulement. 
The remaining explanatory variables were not significantly related 
to either dépendent variable. There is no régional bias by the AIB as 
ail régional dummies are insignificant. Neither the « need » of a spécifie 
labour group, as proxied by the average industry wage level 
(WEEKWGE), nor the size of the group (NOEMPLY) affects the 
Board's décisions. Finally, the AIB does not seem to hâve been impres-
13
 The relationship between BDDATE and APPRVD or ADIFAPP is as strong 
when the sample is limited to the months of March, April and May. 
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sed with the mère existence of a unionized bargaining group. The non-
union dummy variable is not significant. Combined with our earlier re-
sults for STRIDEX, this fact lends credence to the view that only 
those unions ready and willing to strike will receive preferential treat-
ment by the Board. 
To conclude this section, we divide the sample to détermine 
whether there are différences in décision making between levels of 
the AIB, particularly with respect to the STRIDEX variable. Ail cases 
with negotiated wage settlements above the guideline by no more than 
2% are approved by the senior bureaucrats, while those exceeding the 
2% criterion are approved by the Board itself. 
We did find that in the less than 2% sub-sample, STRIDEX is not 
significantîy related to either dépendent variable, and in the other 
sub-sample STRIDEX exhibits a significant positive relationship with 
both. However, using an F-test we were not able to reject the null 
hypothesis that the two coefficients were equal. Nevertheless, thèse 
results do suggest that it is the Board itself, as opposed to the 
bureaucrats, which tends to react to the threat of a strike and be more 
generous to militant unions. 
DISCUSSION 
In this final section of the paper we bring together and briefly 
discuss some of the major results of the analysis. 
The régression results outline a pattern of décision making that 
suggests a prime concern of the AIB during its first year of opération 
was to establish its legitimacy and acceptance as an instrument of the 
government's anti-inflation policy. An important part of this objective is 
the avoidance of disruptive situations that would damage the Board's 
public credibility. It is in this light that we may interpret the positive 
impacts of higher negotiated settlements and a higher strike probability 
on the AIB's approved wage increases. One might view thèse relation-
ships as attempts to avoid undue dissatisfaction by too strict rollbacks of 
negotiated settlements to the guidelines and to avert the possibility of 
strikes in response to AIB rulings, both of which could prove to be 
damaging to the public image and success of the Board. 
Consistent with this interprétation are the négative influences of 
the board date and public sector variables. Ceteris paribus, AIB rulings 
tended to be more generous earlier on in its life and the more visible 
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public sector contracts were granted less generous approvals. The inter-
prétation of the influence of contract length is more spéculative. The 
results show that multiyear contracts receive harsher treatment in their 
first year than do single year contracts, suggesting that the Board may 
use thèse opportunities to achieve «better numbers» in the first year 
while perhaps giving back the wage increases in the latter years of thèse 
contracts. In gênerai terms then, the Anti-Inflation Board would appear 
to be following a course of risk-avoidance and consolidation of its 
position as an arm of anti-inflation policy. 
Finally, while the purpose of this paper has been to examine 
aspects of the AIB's décision-making process, it is interesting to note 
some of the possible implications for those groups coming under the 
jurisdiction of the AIB that arise from our results. 
One possibility is that over time the groups coming before the 
Board learn its behaviour patterns and develop the ability to anticipate 
its décisions. Employers and employées may then in fact begin to 
bargain over the AIB approved wage increases and submit to the Board 
a negotiated settlement that will resuit in their prior «real» settlement 
being returned.14 The more predictable the Board's behaviour the more 
likely is the occurence of this resuit, and the consistency of our results 
over différent spécifications suggests the Board's compensation déci-
sions may indeed be predictable within reasonably narrow limits. 
Alternatively, if the Board does continue to exert a real influence 
on the pattern of wage settlements, our results suggest there may be 
redistributive impacts. Much has been said of the redistribution away 
from labour and towards capital during a period of controls because 
wages are more easily controlled than priées. We hâve no comment to 
make on the merits of this argument. However, other distributive 
conséquences may foliow from controls. The AIB treatment of public 
sector settlements suggests a redistribution of income from public sector 
workers to taxpayers (corporations and individuals) in gênerai. In this 
regard, it is interesting to note the contention that one of the motives 
behind the government's establishment of controls was the désire to 
reduce the power that Fédéral public sector employées gained when 
granted the right to strike in 1967 without having to explicitly rescind 
the right. In addition, the AIB's somewhat softer treatment of militant 
labour groups, combined with the fact that militant groups commanded 
relatively high wages before the program began, suggests that the Anti-
14
 This possibility is noted by OSBERG, Op. Cit. 
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Inflation Board may widen the gap between higher and lower paid 
workers. This statement is true for ail groups in our sample (i.e., where 
the negotiated settlement exceeded the guideline). We cannot say how 
the existance of the AIB afifected the overall income distribution of 
wage earners. 
Our results can only raise the possibility of thèse two alternative 
scénarios. The détermination of which, if either, actually occurs will 
require further research. 
APPENDIX 
The dépendent variables used in this study, APPRVD and ADIFAPP take limited 
values. APPRVD has a maximum of NEGOTD and a minimum of GUIDELN. ADIFAPP 
has a maximum of ADIFNEG and a minimum of zéro. Only the minimum value of 
ADIFAPP is constant from décision to décision, because NEGOTD, GUIDELN and 
ADIFNEG are themselves variables. The possibility of heteroskedasticity, due to trunca-
tion of the dépendent variable, should be greatest with ADIFAPP. Our sample contains 
56 cases for which ADIFAPP = 0. The simplified model with ADIFAPP as dépendent 
variable has been estimated by TOBIT analysis. The estimation process assumes that an 
index, I, is a linear combination of the independent variables : 
I = B0 + B,X, + B2X2 + ... + Bkxk 
If Y is the dépendent variable, behavior is assumed to be as foliows: 
Y = 0 i f l - e ^ 0 
Y = I - e i f I - e > 0 
Where e = is a normally distributed random variable with mean = 0 and standard 
déviation = cr. 
The TOBIT process sélects the maximum liklihood coefficients, Ê. 's, given the under-
lying model. Table A-l présents a comparison of ordinary least squares and TOBIT 
results. AH TOBIT coefficients are larger in absolute size, generally more significant 
and hâve the same signs as ordinary least squares. The différences in the coefficients for 
SECTOR, BDDATE and CLENGTH are substantial, indicating that we hâve under-
estimated the AIB's harsher treatment, cet. par., of public sector workers, and multi-
year contracts and their increasing gênerai toughness through time. 
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TABLE A-1 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
CONSTANT 
ADIFNEG 
ADIFNEG2 
GUIDELN 
BDDATE 
SECTOR 
CLENGTH 
STRIDEX 
N 
Comparison of Tobit and Ordinary Least Squares 
Results for the Percentage Wage Increase in Excess 
of the Guideline Approved by the Anti-Inflation Bpard 
(ADIFAPP = DEPENDENT VARIABLE) 
COEFFICIENT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Tobit Analysis Ordinary Leasl: 
(pseudo t value in parenthesis) Squares 
(t value in parenthesis) 
- .8160 - .7586 
.6208 .5942 
( 13.05)*** ( 16.96)*** 
- .0061 - .0056 
( - 5.38)*** ( - 5.76)*** 
.2238 .1844 
( 3.39)*** ( 3.24)*** 
- .1957 - .1288 
(— 3 51)*** ( - 2.77)*** 
- 1.0084 - .6889 
( - 3.37)*** ( - 2.54)** 
- .4545 - .3292 
( - 2.18)** ( - 1.82)* 
.1231 .0998 
( 2.28)** ( 2.42)** 
346 
* Significant for a two-tail test at the 10% level. 
** Significant for a two-tail test at the 5% level. 
*** Significant for a two-tail test at the 1% level. 
Les décisions de la Commission anti-inflation 
La mise en vigueur d'un programme de contrôle des salaires et des prix en octobre 
1975 a soulevé une longue liste de questions prêtant à débat public et à discussions théo-
riques. Les dossiers de la Commission contiennent une masse considérable de statisti-
ques qui permettent d'apprécier certains aspects du programme et d'en arriver ainsi à 
des conclusions provisoires. 
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Pour chaque augmentation de salaire qui tombe sous la coupe de la Commission, 
l'employeur doit fournir des précisions touchant l'accord négocié ainsi que les rensei-
gnements nécessaires pour calculer les normes qui s'appliquent au groupe concerné. 
Si l'entente conclue excède les normes, la Commission en analyse les motifs et donne 
son approbation à l'intérieur des limites des normes et du taux convenu. 
On a mis au point un modèle d'analyse permettant de connaître, d'après les déci-
sions de la Commission, quel était le nombre de celles où le taux négocié dépassait les 
normes en prenant comme hypothèse que le principal objectif de la Commission, lors de 
son établissement, était d'être reconnue comme un instrument légitime de l'application 
de la politique anti-inflationniste dans son ensemble. Cet objectif premier peut se subdivi-
ser en deux objectifs opérationnels. 
D'abord, la Commission devait être perçue comme un outil efficace destiné à 
contenir le taux d'inflation, soit en matière de gains, à obtenir un certain succès dans 
l'abaissement de ces gains dans les conventions collectives. En second lieu, la Commis-
sion devait s'efforcer d'empêcher l'aliénation des groupes au point de mécontenter le 
public qui exigerait des modifications dans son mandat. La recherche de ce double but 
était en soi contradictoire et ne pouvait que rendre difficile la prise des décisions. Com-
ment, par exemple, la Commission réagirait-elle face à un militantisme syndical qui 
pouvait imposer des règlements supérieurs aux normes établies et décider de faire la grève 
si l'on considérait inacceptable la décision de la Commission? 
Nous pouvions nous attendre à ce que la Commission, face à une grève prévi-
sible si sa décision était défavorable, approuverait une augmentation plus généreuse, 
hypothèse qui ne peut être vérifiée qu'indirectement en mettant au point un indice fondé 
sur l'évolution des grèves dans l'industrie, indice qui devait être relié au règlement 
approuvé. 
Nous nous attendions aussi à ce que plus le règlement dépassait les normes, p|us 
l'augmentation accordée serait supérieure aux normes. De pareilles solutions de compro-
mis auraient pu être fréquentes, compte tenu du fait qu'il lui fallait être efficace dans le 
freinage d'accords trop élevés tout en en ameutant pas les syndicats contre elle. On 
pouvait encore présumer que la Commission serait mieux acceptée si elle adoptait la ligne 
dure envers les groupes que le public avait à l'œil. À tout prendre, les conventions 
collectives du secteur public ne sont-elles pas plus « voyantes » que celles du secteur privé ? 
Nous pouvions donc nous attendre à des approbations moins fortes dans le secteur 
public en général. Plus une institution s'affirme et plus ses procédures prennent un 
caractère rituel, plus la discrétion des personnes chargées de l'appliquer diminue, 
phénomène qui devait se traduire par l'existence d'un plus petit nombre d'exceptions 
à la règle et, partant, d'approbation moins fortes. D'autres variables qu'il fallait inclure 
dans l'analyse étaient la longueur des conventions, les taux moyens de salaire payés par 
l'industrie et les conditions régionales. 
Les modèles furent vérifiés à partir d'un échantillonnage de 346 décisions de la 
Commission. Les résultats ainsi obtenus confirment l'hypothèse principale. Les aug-
mentations approuvées par la Commission sont significatives, reliées positivement aux 
augmentations de salaires négociés et à l'indice des grèves. Les approbations sont 
nettement plus basses dans le secteur public. Enfin, la Commission a donné des appro-
bations plus faibles à mesure que le temps s'écoulait. 
